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Readings on Speech and Protest in China 
August 29, 2009 in The Five-List Plan, Xinjiang by The China Beat | Permalink 
1. Hu Jintao has made a trip to Xinjiang, his first since riots there in July. Xinjiang was in the news 
earlier this week as well, when international news organizations picked up a story, first reported in 
Monday’s China Daily, which announced that trials would begin shortly for more than 200 people 
arrested in connection with the riots. The regional government, however, quickly denied that any trials 
have been scheduled, and stated that only 83 people have been officially arrested to date. Over at 
the Wall Street Journal’s China blog, Sky Canaves writes on this story and what it reveals about the 
media landscape in China today: 
Regardless of which account is accurate, the episode appears to be yet another reminder of the 
unofficialness of much of what is still often called China’s “official” media. Once upon a time, China 
Daily (and much of the rest of the country’s state-run media), could be relied on to dutifully relay the 
government’s pronouncements – especially on sensitive issues – and to do little else. But in today’s 
increasingly competitive media landscape, China Daily and other publications often doing their own 
reporting – with all the potential that brings for publishing things that don’t accord with the official 
line. It can be confusing for readers to discern the difference. 
2. Another post by Sky Canaves at the WSJ blog discusses the release of Xu Zhiyong from custody on 
Sunday morning. Xu was granted qubao houshen, or “obtain a guarantor while pending trial”–not 
exactly bail, but closer to non-custodial detention or probation. Although Xu’s supporters are calling 
this a victory, Canaves reports that Chinese authorities can use qubao houshen to their advantage as 
well: 
Unlike in the United States, where bail is routinely granted in cases where the suspect doesn’t pose a 
major flight risk or a danger to society, qubao houshen is rarely granted to Chinese suspects, who are 
generally held in custody until trial. China’s legal activists have long called for authorities to increase 
the availability of bail to suspects in criminal cases, especially when relatively minor crimes are 
involved. 
The fact that bail is granted only in extraordinary cases in China has led many to proclaim Mr. Xu’s 
release as a sort of victory, even if only temporary. As Mr. Xu himself noted, police are still 
investigating his tax evasion case and he may still be subject to prosecution . . . 
However, in certain respects, Mr. Xu’s release puts police in a better position to continue investigating 
him. Under qubao houshen, police can monitor his activities for a full year, investigating not only the 
tax charges for which Mr. was arrested, but any other leads that could be used to make a case against 
him. Had Mr. Xu been kept in custody, the police investigation would have typically had a much 
shorter period of a few months in which to conclude their investigation. 
3. Malcolm Moore at the Telegraph examines the current “beat and compress,” orda ya, mode of the 
Chinese government. The da ya mode is most prominently characterized by the recent detentions of 
many leading activists as the government tightens its control. Although many observers are linking 
this da ya period to a desire for stability in the lead-up to the quickly approaching 60th anniversary of 
the PRC, Moore writes, “The question is whether the current round of da ya will relent after the 
anniversary passes in October, or whether it is the beginning of a longer period of repressive 
measures by the Communist Party.” 
4. Alec Ash, who blogs at Six, has a piece at the Huffington Post on today’s Chinese university 
students and their attitudes toward the 1989 Tiananmen protests. While Beijing University (“Beida”) 
students led several major protest movements during the twentieth century, Ash’s conversations with 
members of the campus community show that times have changed: 
In 2009 — a new generation of students, a fresh capitalist incarnation of ‘new China’ — there is no 
indication in Beida of such a rebellious past. The 90th anniversary of May 4th and 20th of Tiananmen 
passed on campus not so much without incident as without notice. 
Ash takes up the question of why current Chinese students are less active in protest movements than 
their predecessors were, and disagrees with some answers, such as disinterest and lack of knowledge 
about the past, that are frequently offered by the foreign press when contemplating this issue: 
If a Beida student doesn’t talk to Western journalists about their personal views on May 4th, 
Tiananmen or any other taboo, it doesn’t mean they are ignorant or don’t have any. There are plenty 
of students reading banned books and discussing forbidden topics – they do it in their dorms (if 
cautiously, in case of informers), or more quietly in canteens. Just not anywhere where they might 
seem to be taking a public stand. 
But, these dorm discussions are (I hazard a generalisation) more in agreement with the general status 
quo in China than they are against it. While democracy is an appealing model for most, they are not 
convinced it is an appealing model for China at this point in its development. Western ideas no longer 
hold sway for them purely by virtue of being Western. They would all go study in America in a 
heartbeat, but none fawn over the US: many are disillusioned by Western press coverage of China, 
and Timothy Geithner’s June visit to campus barely raised a head from its study. They consider 
themselves less naive than their predecessors, and most think of protest as simply not the way to fix 
China’s domestic problems – rather, they believe central government is doing a good job in difficult 
circumstances. A surprising number of those I talked to volunteered that their futures are brighter for 
the failure of Tiananmen and the economic miracle which followed it. 
5. The myths and realities of China’s firewall are the topic of a post at the China Solved blog. While 
the blocks against social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube might appear 
inconsequential to those working in the business world, the post’s author argues otherwise: 
The 20th century benchmarks for international trade were how many containers or freighters one 
nation sent across the water to another. In the 21st century, it will be about data, viewers and users. 
The few big sites that have been blocked and hobbled in China are powering thousands of small 
businesses and driving the future of online commerce. China has become a dead-zone for any 
business planning on building an international online presence. 
Tags: Xinjiang 
 
